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Liberalism is frequently viewed as a child of the Enlightenment.1  Some of the more 
important figures within the liberal tradition, such as Locke and Kant, played significant 
roles in the Enlightenment, while others, such as John Stuart Mill and John Rawls, 
constructed their theories on the basis of principles first elaborated within the 
Enlightenment. Both liberalism and the Enlightenment have typically been seen as 
emphasizing the protection of individual rights over the more ambitious aim of achieving 
the human good. Indeed, both tend to be uneasy with talk of an ultimate good, advising 
tolerance of diverging conceptions of the ultimate purpose of life. Both traditions have a 
tendency to focus on the individual rather than the collectivity in their moral philosophies 
and their social theories alike. Thus, there are good reasons for supposing that those who 
regard the development of liberalism and the spread of Enlightenment as “aspects of one 
and the same current of thought and practice”(Gray 1986, 16) are not entirely misguided. 
The identification of liberalism and the Enlightenment is not, however, quite as 
straightforward as it first appears. While it may be the case that leading figures of the 
English Enlightenment (assuming, for the purposes of argument, that we can speak of 
such a thing as an English Enlightenment)2 also played a major role in the history of the 
development of liberalism, it is not at all clear that this relationship holds everywhere 
                                                
1 For an overview of some of the received wisdom on this point, see Garrard 1997, 281-82.  For an 
account of Enlightenment natural law theory attentive to the ways in which these generalizations do 
not hold up, see Haakonssen 1996 
2 For an argument that there was one, see Porter 1981. 
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else. Eighteenth-century Prussia offers one counterexample worth examining. During the 
last quarter of the eighteenth century, a wide-ranging debate on the nature and limits of 
enlightenment raged in the pages of scholarly and popular journals (see Schmidt 1996). 
One particularly fierce sideline of this more general controversy was the dispute between 
Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi and Moses Mendelssohn over Jacobi’s claim that 
Mendelssohn’s friend Gotthold Ephraim Lessing had, shortly before his death, revealed 
to Jacobi that he was a “Spinozist.” In the debate that followed — which came to be 
known, somewhat misleadingly, as the “Pantheism Dispute” — Mendelssohn defended 
the Enlightenment against Jacobi’s criticisms.3 Yet Mendelssohn, even when he was 
advocating such traditional liberal values as religious toleration, argued in ways that are 
difficult to square with our understanding of liberalism, while much in the views of 
Jacobi, the critic of the Enlightenment, is conventionally liberal. 
In what follows I will first discuss Mendelssohn’s defense of the idea of 
enlightenment and his arguments in favor of religious toleration. I will then examine 
Jacobi’s critique of the Enlightenment in both its philosophical and its political 
dimensions.  I will conclude with a suggestion about the tension between rationalist and 
critical strains within the Enlightenment and its significance for the relationship between 
liberalism and the Enlightenment. 
 
Mendelssohn’s Defense of Enlightenment and Religious Liberty 
In December 1783 the Berlinische Monatsschrift published an article by the theologian 
and educational reformer Johann Friedrich Zöllner that, in a footnote, posed the question 
“What is enlightenment?” (Hinske and Albrecht 1990, 115).  Zöllner’s question launched 
a debate that over the next decade would fill the pages of German literary journals and 
                                                
3 For general discussions of the Pantheism Dispute, see Beiser 1987, 44-126, Beck 1969, 352-74, and 
Scholz 1916, lix-lxxvii. 
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moral weeklies.  While Immanuel Kant’s answer to the question in the December 1784 
issue of the Berlinische Monatsschrift  is by far the most famous,  it was not the first 
response to the question published by that journal.  As Kant (1996, 64) noted in the 
closing footnote of his essay, three months earlier the journal had published an article on 
Zöllner’s question by the great German-Jewish man of letters Moses Mendelssohn. 
The question that appeared in the Berlinische Monatsschrift  had been under 
discussion for several months in the Berlin Wednesday Society, a secret society of 
“Friends of Enlightenment” closely linked to the journal.  Its members included Zöllner 
and Mendelssohn.4 While Kant’s response was written without knowledge of the 
extensive discussions of the question within the Wednesday Society, Mendelssohn’s 
essay represented, in part, an effort to summarize the debate about the nature, the 
advisability, and the possible limits of enlightenment that occupied the distinguished 
group of civil servants, clergy, and men of letters who made up the Wednesday Society.5  
It is difficult to consider the members of the Wednesday Society liberals.6 Some, such as 
the jurists Karl Gottlieb Svarez and Ernst Ferdinand Klein, were members of the Prussian 
bureaucracy who, committed to the reforms initiated by Frederick the Great, accepted the 
idea that it was the duty of the state to undertake measures that would further the 
common well-being of its citizens, and who viewed as legitimate the police powers that 
the state exercised over the material and spiritual lives of its citizens in pursuit of this 
goal (see Raeff 1975). Meanwhile, the clerical members of the Wednesday Society, all of 
whom embraced enlightened views on the relationship between reason and religion, 
                                                
4 For a discussion of the Wednesday Society and its membership, see Birtsch 1996. 
5 I have discussed the relationship between the published responses and the secret discussions in 
Schmidt 1989. 
6 For a general discussion of the relationship between the liberalism and enlightenment in Germany, 
see Beiser 1992, 15-26, 309-17. 
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expressed no qualms about the integration of their churches into the bureaucracy.  Johann 
Joachim Spalding, Johann Samuel Diterich, William Abraham Teller were members of 
the Upper Consistory [Oberkonsistorium], the chief governing body of the Lutheran 
Church.  Established as a part of the Prussian bureaucracy in 1750, the Upper Consistory 
was responsible for the appointment and supervision of clergy, the instruction of 
theological students, and the approval of candidates for teaching positions at the Lutheran 
seminaries.7 Karl Franz von Irwing and Friedrich Gedike, also members of the 
Wednesday Society, were lay members of the Upper Consistory.  There were members of 
the Wednesday Society who had no ties to the Prussian bureaucracy, including the writer 
and publisher Friedrich Nicolai, the philosopher and dramatist Johann Jacob Engel, and 
Mendelssohn.  But even those who were not directly connected with the bureaucracy 
appear to have had few, if any, reservations about the program of reform absolutism. 
Indeed, the Wednesday Society itself testified to the shared assumptions that brought 
together reformist elements within the state bureaucracy engaged in the process of 
modernizing and rationalizing the legal code, enlightened clergy who practiced an 
interpretation of Christian doctrine that emphasized civic and social responsibilities, and 
philosophers who, in company with publicists, sought to transmit new and useful 
knowledge to a new reading public.  For the members of the Berlin Wednesday Society, 
the state and the churches administered by it were potential instruments for social 
improvement, not barriers to reform  — a situation far different from that faced by the 
French philosophes.8  Their effort at enlightening the citizenry presupposed a state with 
the authority to intervene in the lives of its subjects to a degree that would be anathema to 
later liberal theorists. 
                                                
7 For a discussion of the Oberkonsistorium and its responsibilities see Birtsch 1990. 
8 For a contrast between the situation faced by French philosophes  and the German Aufklärer see 
Hampson 1981, 45 and Whaley 1981, 117. Also, see the discussion in La Vopa 1990, 35-37. 
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Mendelssohn’s article in response to Zöllner’s question represented an attempt to 
pull together the various strains of the discussion of enlightenment that predated the 
appearance of Zöllner’s article in the Berlinische Monatsschrift .9  In formulating his 
summary, Mendelssohn focused on the relationship of the term “enlightenment” to two 
other related concepts: “culture” [Kultur],  and “education”  [Bildung].  All three terms, 
he argued, denoted “modifications of social life, the consequences of the industry and the 
efforts of men to better their social conditions” (Mendelssohn 1996, 53). The most 
fundamental of the three terms was Bildung — a term which defies easy translation and 
can be rendered as “culture,” “education,” “formation,” or “development.”  In the 
demarcation Mendelssohn proposed in his response to Zöllner, Aufklärung  refers to the 
“theoretical” side of the process of Bildung  and involves a “rational reflection on the 
things of human life.”  Kultur, in contrast, is concerned with “practical” matters, with 
“goodness, refinement, and beauty in handmade arts and social mores” (Mendelssohn 
1996, 53). Summarizing the distinction for a friend shortly after the publication of his 
essay, he wrote, “Enlightenment  is concerned with the theoretical, with knowledge, with 
the elimination of prejudices;  Culture  is concerned with morality, sociality, art, with 
doing and not doing.”10   
The distinction between Aufklärung, Kultur, and Bildung proposed by 
Mendelssohn in his response to Zöllner’s question echoed a distinction he had made a 
year earlier in Jerusalem, his treatise on religious toleration. Where his response to 
                                                
9 The origins of the discussion within the Wednesday Society may be traced to the lecture of December 
17, 1783 by Johann Karl Möhsen (translated as Möhsen 1996). 
10 Letter to August Hennings of November 27, 1784 in Mendelssohn, 1977, 237. Note also his letter to 
Hennings of June 29, 1779, where Mendelssohn described his planned translations and commentaries 
on the scriptures as “the first step towards culture from which my people is, alas, kept at such a 
distance” (Mendelssohn 1976,149). 
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Zöllner subdivided Bildung into Kultur and Aufklärung, Jerusalem subdivided Bildung 
into “government” [Regierung] and “education” [Erziehung]. Government concerns itself 
with the actions of members of society and seeks to direct them towards the common 
good by providing them with “reasons that motivate the will” [Bewegungsgründe].  
Education seeks to instill in individuals those convictions that motivate these actions, and 
attempts to do so by offering “reasons that persuade by their truth” [Wahrheitsgründe] 
(Mendelssohn 1983, 40). Despite the difference in terminology between Mendelssohn’s 
article in the Berlinische Monatsschrift  and his discussion in Jerusalem , the parallels are 
not difficult to see. “Enlightenment” and “education” are concerned with convictions, 
which they attempt to shape by examining the truth or falsehood of the beliefs which 
sustain these convictions. “Culture” and “government” are concerned with actions, which 
they seek to influence by providing incentives and disincentives that motivate the will. 
At first glance, both Mendelssohn’s understanding of enlightenment and his 
account of the relationship between church and state would appear to adhere to well-worn 
conventions in liberal thought.  Like Locke’s Letter Concerning Toleration, a work he 
knew and admired, Mendelssohn distinguishes “external” actions from “internal” 
convictions. He is concerned to confine the use of the coercive powers of the state to 
controlling the external actions of individuals. While legislation, with its system of 
rewards and punishments, can serve as an appropriate means for the motivation of the 
will,  Mendelssohn — like Locke before him — thought it folly to assume that 
convictions could be coerced through laws establishing oaths of religious conformity.  
Where Locke and Mendelssohn part company was over Locke’s attempt to distinguish 
“the business of civil government from that of religion and to settle the just bounds that 
lie between the one and the other.”  Locke had defined civil government as “a Society of 
Men constituted only for the procuring, preserving, and advancing of their own Civil 
Interests” and defined “civil interests” as including “life, liberty, health, and indolency of 
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body; and the possession of outward things, such as money, lands, houses, furniture, and 
the like.” He explicitly denied that the state was concerned with the “the Salvation of 
Souls.”  This was the proper concern of the church, “a voluntary society of men, joining 
together of their own accord, in order to the public worshipping of God, in such manner 
as they judge acceptable to him, and effectual to the Salvation of their Souls” (Locke 
1983, 28). 
Mendelssohn’s dissent from Locke moved on two levels. First, where Locke 
granted churches the right to expel members who dissented from the established 
principles of the church (with the proviso that excommunication could carry no civil 
penalties), Mendelssohn resisted the idea of granting even this much coercive power to 
religion. 
Civil society, viewed as a moral person, can have the right of 
coercion, and, in fact, has actually obtained this right through the 
social contract. Religious society lays no claim to the right of 
coercion, and cannot obtain it by any possible contact. The state 
possesses perfect, the church only imperfect rights. (Mendelssohn 
1983, 45) 
While the state had the power to order and to coerce, religion has only power of “love 
and beneficence.”  “The only rights possessed by the church,” Mendelssohn (1983 59-60) 
insisted, “are to admonish, to instruct, to fortify, and to comfort; and the duties of the 
citizens toward the church are an attentive ear and a willing heart.” 
Second, Mendelssohn questioned the exclusively secular focus of Locke’s 
understanding of “civil things.”  For Mendelssohn (1983, 42), the best form of 
government was that state which “achieves its purposes by morals and convictions; in the 
degree, therefore, to which government is by education [Erziehung] itself.” Hence, “one 
of the state’s principal efforts must be to govern men through morals and convictions.” 
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Since laws cannot create convictions, and rewards and punishments cannot produce 
principles or refine morals, the only means the state has available for influencing the 
morals and the convictions of its citizens is “persuasion [Ueberzeugung].”   
It is here that religion should come to the aid of the state, and the 
church should become a pillar of civil felicity. It is the business of 
the church to convince people, in the most emphatic manner, of the 
truth of noble principles and convictions; to show them that duties 
toward men are also duties toward God, the violation of which is in 
itself the greatest misery … ; that serving the state is true service of 
God,  law [Recht] and justice [Gerechtigkeit] are commandments 
of God, and charity is his most sacred will; and that true 
knowledge of the Creator cannot leave behind in the soul any 
hatred for men. (Mendelssohn 43; omission in translation 
corrected.) 
Circumstances such as the growth of population or the development of cultural 
differences may force the state to rely increasingly on externally binding coercive laws, 
but Mendelssohn holds that these must be seen as secondary remedies, used by the state 
when it cannot achieve its ends in tandem with religion through the shaping of the 
convictions and morality of the population. 
Mendelssohn explicitly rejected Locke’s restriction of “civil interests” to the 
“temporal welfare” of the individual.  It is, Mendelssohn (1983, 39) argued, 
neither in keeping with the truth nor advantageous to man’s 
welfare to sever the temporal so neatly from the eternal. At bottom, 
man will never partake of eternity; his eternity is merely an 
incessant temporality. His temporality never ends; it is, therefore, 
an essential part of his permanency and inseparable from it. One 
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confuses ideas if one opposes his temporal welfare to his eternal 
felicity. 
Thus, the state cannot be completely indifferent to the matters that transcend the 
immediate concerns of “life, liberty, health, and indolency of body” and “the possession 
of outward things.”  The distinction between state and religion, Mendelssohn maintains, 
cannot be made at the level of the interests each seeks to advance. The state differs from 
religion in that it alone has the authority to shape actions through coercive laws. But it 
can enter into a partnership with religion in advancing, though education and persuasion, 
both the temporal and the eternal interests of individuals. 
To see more particularly what Mendelssohn might have had in mind, we need 
only look at the article in the Berlinische Monatsschrift  that served as a spur for 
Zöllner’s question in the first place. The article to which Zöllner responded had been 
written by a fellow member of the Wednesday Society: Johann Erich Biester, librarian of 
the Royal Library in Berlin and co-editor (with the educational reformer and Gymnasium 
director Friedrich Gedike) of the Berlinische Monatsschrift.11 His article maintained that 
the presence of the clergy at marriage ceremonies led the “unenlightened citizen” to feel 
that the marriage contract was unique in that it was made with God himself, while other 
contracts “are only made with men, and are therefore less meaningful.”  Because of this 
tendency to underestimate the importance of contracts which did not require clerical 
participation, Biester concluded that a purely civil wedding ceremony would be 
appropriate not only for the “enlightened citizen,” who “can do without all of the 
ceremonies,” but also for the unenlightened citizen, who would learn that all laws and 
contracts deserve respect (Hinske and Albrecht 1990, 95). 
                                                
11 The article was signed with the initials “E. v. K.”, a pseudonym that Beister had used on other 
occasions. See the editorial note in Hinske and Albrecht 1990, 484. 
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Biester’s intent, then, was not to remove religion from public life, but rather to 
teach citizens that all civil responsibilities, not just marriage, had a religious dimension.  
“How excellent,” he wrote, “if faith and civil duty were more integrated, if all laws had 
the sacredness of religious prescription” (Hinske and Albrecht 1990, 99). 
O when comes the time, that the concern for the religion of a state 
is no longer the private monopoly of a few who often lead the state 
into disorder, but rather becomes itself again the business of the 
state.  …  Then we will have once again state, citizen, patriots; 
undefiled would be the debased names.  …  Let politics and 
religion, law and catechism be one! (Hinske and Albrecht 1990, 
101-102) 
Formulations such as these are far removed from Jefferson’s “thick wall” between church 
and state.   
There is one final feature of Mendelssohn’s definition of enlightenment that calls 
for comment. Near the start of the essay,  Mendelssohn (1996, 54) states,  “I posit, at all 
times, the destiny of man  [Bestimmung des Menschens] as the measure and goal of all 
our striving and efforts,  as a point on which we must set our eyes if we do not wish to 
lose our way.” The more a people is brought, through art and industry, into harmony with 
this destiny, the more “Bildung ” we ascribe to it.  The goal is that culture and 
enlightenment join together to advance, and if it is ever forgotten, both will fall into 
corruption.12  Mendelssohn had taken the notion from Johann Joachim Spalding’s Destiny 
of Man.  First published in 1748,  Spalding’s book was one of the most successful 
                                                
12 For a discussion of the centrality of the notion of the “destiny of man” for Mendelssohn’s work, see 
Hinske 1981, 94-99. 
Liberalism and Enlightenment in Eighteenth -Century Germany  11 
 
products of enlightenment theology.13 Through a series meditations on the questions 
“Why do I exist?” and “What should I do?”, the book sought to discover a fundamental 
rule that could serve to guide one’s life.  The first possibility Spalding considered was 
that of a life devoted to the satisfaction of physical drives, a possibility he quickly 
dismissed as offering no permanent satisfaction.  Spalding next weighed the possibility of 
a life devoted to a more refined sort of desire, that associated with aesthetic experience.  
Such a life, however, takes no consideration of my relationship to others, and it too is 
rejected.  Spalding then turned to a life devoted to the pursuit of virtue, which proved to 
be the first serious possibility as a destiny for man.14   Spalding, who translated the works 
Shaftesbury and Butler, shared their view that there is a natural disposition in mankind to 
work for the common good. For Spalding (1908, 25) our “natural” ability to judge 
matters of right and wrong is, in fact, the “voice of God, the voice of eternal truth, which 
speaks in me.” This voice impels us to act to bring about a state of happiness that, 
because of the contingencies of human existence, can never be achieved on earth.  This 
very failure to achieve the greatest good in this world holds out the promise of a future 
life wherein “my constrained and beclouded soul will be given so much more light and 
freedom that I will be assured of a complete enlightenment of all the obscure parts of the 
plan by which the world is ruled” (ibid., 28). This, then, is the ultimate end for which 
man is destined: immortality in the kingdom of God. 
This account of human destiny provided Mendelssohn with what, in more recent 
literature, might be characterized as a “thick” theory of the human good.  In the 
remainder of his essay in response to Zöllner’s question, Mendelssohn (1784, 116; 
Schmidt 1996, 54) discussed how this general destiny was subdivided into different 
                                                
13 For discussions of Spalding’s book and its impact, see Schollmeier 1967, 56-65 and Adler 1994, 125-
37. 
14 For the argument thus far, see Spalding 1908, 16-24. 
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particular destinies and how this division set the stage for potential conflicts that might 
arise between the universal  “destiny of man as man” and one particular destiny that 
individuals fulfill: the “destiny of man as citizen [Bürger].”  The problem does not arise 
for the practical dimension of Bildung.  The goal of culture is the improvement of a social 
order that is divided into different estates and bound together by a network of rights and 
duties.  Its task is to make sure that agreement between the various parts of the society is 
achieved.  Its end can thus be nothing other than the cultivation of a Bürger, a member of 
political society, possessing certain rights and duties,  equipped with the skills and 
abilities to perform a specific set of tasks.  From the standpoint of culture,  then, man’s 
destiny is simply membership in civil society. 
On the theoretical side of the process of Bildung, however, it is possible for there 
to be a conflict between the “destiny of man as man” and the “destiny of man as citizen.”  
Enlightenment has two differing aspects, an “enlightenment of the citizen 
[Bürgeraufklärung],” which must adjust itself according to the ranks of society it 
addresses, and an “enlightenment of man [Menschenaufklärung],” which is “universal” 
and pays heed neither to social distinctions nor to the maintenance of social order.  
“Certain truths,” Mendelssohn (1996, 55) noted, “that are useful to men, as men, can at 
times be harmful to them as citizens.” So long as this “collision” between the 
enlightenment of man and the enlightenment of citizen is confined to matters that do not 
directly address what Mendelssohn termed the “essential” destiny of man as man or man 
as citizen,  and thus do not put into question either those aspects of men that distinguish 
them from animals or those dimensions of civic duties that are necessary for the 
preservation of public order, Mendelssohn (1996, 55) saw little cause for concern and 
argued that rules can easily be drawn up to resolve potential conflicts. It is an entirely 
different matter when a conflict arises between the “essential” destiny of man as citizen 
and either one’s “essential” or “extra-essential” [außerwesentlichen] destiny as man.   
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The “essential destiny of man,” Mendelssohn explained in a letter to Hennings, 
“is a matter of existence [Daseyn], the extra-essential destiny is a matter of improvement 
[Besserseyn].”  The first generates “perfection,” the other “beauty.” If it is not possible to 
achieve both, the latter must give way (Mendelssohn 1977, 236).15 “In the absence of the 
essential destiny of man,” Mendelssohn (1996, 55) explained in the Berlinische 
Monatsschrift , “man sinks to the level of the beast;  without the extra-essential destiny, 
he is no longer a good and splendid creature.” The most severe conflict occurs in those 
“unhappy” times when the essential destinies of man as man and man as citizen collide.  
In such cases the enlightenment that “is indispensable for man cannot be disseminated 
through all classes of the realm without the constitution being in danger of perishing.” 
Here philosophy lays its hand on its mouth!  Here necessity may 
prescribe laws, or rather forge fetters, that are applied to mankind, 
to force them down, and hold them under the yoke! (Mendelssohn 
1996, 55) 
When man’s “essential” destiny as a citizen collides with his “extra-essential” destiny as 
man, the consequences are less grim.  Here it is not a question of the state reducing man 
to the level of a beast, but rather of a situation where “certain useful and — for mankind 
— adorning truths may not be disseminated without destroying prevailing religious and 
moral tenets”(Mendelssohn 1996, 55). Mendelssohn was echoing the views of a number 
of his colleagues in the Wednesday Society who saw a need to set limits to 
enlightenment; and he argued that in such cases the “virtue-loving bearer of 
                                                
15  My rendering of Mendelssohn’s “außerwesentlichen” as “unessential” in my translation of 
Mendelssohn’s essay (Mendelssohn 1996) now strikes me as potentially misleading.  In the passages 
that follow, I have translated the term as “extra-essential.” 
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enlightenment will proceed with prudence and discretion and endure prejudice rather than 
drive away the truth that is so closely intertwined with it” (Mendelssohn 1996, 55).16  
Mendelssohn’s conception of enlightenment thus results in an approach to politics 
that is difficult to square with our typical understanding of what constitutes liberalism. It 
allowed for a considerably greater blurring of the boundaries between church and state, 
and it allowed for rather significant limitations on freedom of expression. With 
Spalding’s notion of the “destiny of man” providing him with a “thick” account of the 
human good, Mendelssohn allowed for political institutions that aimed at bringing about 
this good, even at the cost of limiting what some might see as the rights of individuals. 
Certainly there are formulations, particularly in Mendelssohn’s Jerusalem, that prefigure 
certain aspects of the positions that would eventually be found in thinkers such as John 
Stuart Mill (or, staying within the German tradition, Mill’s own inspiration, Wilhelm von 
Humboldt). But what prevents us from treating Mendelssohn as “anticipating” certain 
liberal formulations is the presence of a contemporary who had already presented a 
recognizably liberal account of the state: Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi. Making matters 
difficult for those assuming easy linkages between liberalism and the Enlightenment, he 
was one of the Enlightenment’s most vocal critics. 
 
Jacobi on  Faith and Political Power 
Jacobi’s critique of the Enlightenment reached its climax in his dispute with 
Mendelssohn over the question of whether Lessing, shortly before his death, had 
embraced Spinozism — a designation that, despite Mendelssohn’s attempted 
rehabilitation of Spinoza in his Philosophical Dialogues of 1755, remained tantamount to 
                                                
16  For a discussion of the debate within the Wednesday Society on this question, see Hellmuth 1982, 
315-45. 
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an accusation of atheism.17 According to Jacobi,  during a conversation in the summer of 
1780 Lessing had expressed admiration for Goethe’s unpublished (and, to many 
contemporaries, sacrilegious) poem “Prometheus,” and he had rejected “all orthodox 
conceptions of the divinity” in favor of the ancient Greek concept of the “One and All” 
(hen kai pan).  When a shocked Jacobi asked whether this did not amount to an 
allegiance to Spinozism,  Lessing allegedly responded, “If I were to name myself after 
someone, I know of no other.”18 
In notifying Mendelssohn of Lessing’s statement, Jacobi was motivated by 
something other than an interest preventing Mendelssohn (who at the time was working 
once again on his oft-delayed eulogy for his friend) from neglecting an important — if 
disquieting — turn in Lessing’s beliefs. Behind Jacobi’s letter stood a deeply held 
antagonism toward the political and philosophical positions of Mendelssohn and the 
Berlin Enlightenment.19  Prior to his dispute with Mendelssohn,  Jacobi was known 
primarily as the author of Woldemar and The Letters of Edward Allwill,  two 
philosophical novels that shared some of the hostility of the Sturm und Drang toward the 
Enlightenment’s purportedly one-sided emphasis on reason at the expense of sentiment 
                                                
17 Conversely, Spinoza was revered by radical exponents of toleration, freedom speech, and political 
reform. On this underground reputation of Spinoza in Germany see Beiser 1987, 48-52. 
18 For the letter, see Mendelssohn, —, 13: 135-53; for the statement on Spinoza see ibid.,  137-38. 
For discussions, see Altmann, 1973, 613-21; Beiser 1987, 65-69; and Saine 1997, 214, who notes the 
importance of the hypothetical form of Lessing’s response, which does not mean “that he had to 
identify himself with any group or master.” 
19 For a discussion of Jacobi’s general strategy in the Pantheism Dispute, see Altmann 1994, 6-8. 
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and feeling.20  Jacobi’s initial literary efforts had been encouraged by Lessing, and after 
Lessing’s death in 1781 Jacobi sent copies of his novels to Mendelssohn, seeking support 
in the face of less-than-favorable reviews.  Mendelssohn, repelled by what he saw as their 
excessive sentimentality,  responded by suggesting that Jacobi aim for a greater 
“simplicity of style”  — which was hardly what Jacobi wanted to hear.21  The rebuff 
convinced Jacobi that Mendelssohn had been corrupted by the “magisterial, self-satisfied 
demeanor” that he saw as the hallmark of the “morgue berlinoise.” (Mauthner 1912, 17; 
Altmann 1973, 604).   
Jacobi’s attack on the Berlin Enlightenment had begun several years earlier with a 
critique of its politics.  Between 1759 and 1761, Jacobi studied in Geneva, a city that had 
become the emblem of republican virtue for many during the eighteenth century. He 
returned from his studies with a  hatred of absolutism and a contempt for “the stupidity of 
people who in our century regard superstition as more dangerous than the growing power 
of unrestrained autocracy.”22  In 1782 he published a short work entitled Something 
Lessing Said, which began by recalling a conversation in which Lessing had said that all 
                                                
20 For a discussion of the novels, see George di Giovanni’s introduction to Jacobi 1994, 117-51. For 
discussions of Jacobi’s relationship with the Sturm und Drang see Nicolai ,  1971, 347-60; Heraeus 
1928, 94-95; and Pascal 1953, 3, 151-52. 
21 Mendelssohn’s opinion was communicated to Jacobi by Christian Wilhelm Dohm in his letter of 
December 18, 1781 (in Zoeppritz, 1869, I:50). The letter begins with an allusion by Dohm to a 
warning in an earlier letter from Jacobi on the need to avoid contamination by “the Berlin spirit.” 
22 Letter to J. W. L. Gleim of May 31, 1782, in Jacobi 1987, 35-6. For Jacobi’s early political views, see 
Homann 1973, 38-96. On the significance of the image of Geneva during the Enlightenment, see 
Venturi, 1971, 84. 
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of the arguments of princes against the rights of the papacy were “either groundless or 
applied with double and triple force to the princes themselves”(Jacobi 1996, 191).23   
The immediate point of departure for Jacobi’s somewhat disorganized essay was 
the publication of Johannes von Müller’s Journeys of the Popes, a critique of the 
autocratic character of the rule of Austria’s Joseph II. Von Müller’s work, in turn, had 
been occasioned by the visit of Pope Pius VI to Vienna in response to Joseph’s radical 
educational and ecclesiastical reforms. In the opening pages of Something Lessing Said, 
Jacobi suggested parallels between von Müller’s critique of Joseph and Justus Möser’s 
critique of Frederick the Great’s actions in the legal controversy involving the case of a 
miller named Arnold, who had sued the lord of a neighboring manor because the lord’s 
newly constructed carp pond had drawn water away from his mill, making him unable to 
meet rent payments to the lord of his own manor. Frederick was convinced that Arnold 
had received unfair treatment from the noble judges who had dismissed his suit. When an 
appeals court did not find for Arnold, Frederick reversed their decision, and imprisoned 
not only the judges who had initially decided against Arnold, but also the seven justices 
who had refused to grant his appeal. While Frederick’s reversal of what he regarded as 
yet another instance of the aristocracy exploiting commoners enjoyed considerable 
support, Möser was troubled by what he saw as the capriciousness of the action. In “On 
the Important Difference between Real and Formal Law,” the essay Jacobi cited at the 
start of Something Lessing Said,  Möser (1986, 99-100) criticized Frederick’s flouting of 
the rule of law, and argued that a monarch “who bids compliance to a real truth just as he 
does a formal one overthrows the first and fundamental law, holy to every state.”  
For Jacobi, both Joseph’s reforms and Frederick’s intervention on Arnold’s behalf 
highlighted what Jacobi saw as the central failing of the advocates of enlightenment: their 
                                                
23 For discussions of this essay, see Snow 1996 and Beiser 1992, 145-47. 
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complicity with autocratic forms of rule, as long as the results of the policies of these 
rulers were seen as “enlightened.”  
The great mass of our thinkers … want to see the essentially true 
and the essentially good spread by power, and want to see every 
error suppressed by power. They would like to help promote an 
enlightenment — elsewhere than in the understanding, because 
that takes too long. They put out the lights, filled with childish 
impatience for it to be day.  Oh hope-filled darkness, in which we 
hurriedly totter our way toward the goal of our wishes,  toward the 
greatest good on earth;  forward, on the path of violence and 
subjugation! (Jacobi 1996, 192) 
Seeking to achieve substantive ends that were presumed to serve the public’s greater 
interest, the enlightened supporters of absolutism paid little heed, Jacobi argued, to the 
damage that was being done to the rule of law, the rights of individuals, and the civic life 
of the nation.  
Jacobi insisted that civil society was, and could only be,  “a mechanism of 
coercion” whose function should be simply “to secure for every member his inviolable 
property in his person, the free use of all his powers, and the full enjoyment of the fruits 
of their employment”(Jacobi 1996, 195). Attempts by apologists for enlightened 
absolutism to justify more extensive state intervention in the life of its citizens — 
whether justified by appeals to the “interests of state” or the “welfare of the whole” — 
led only to “the advancement of self-interest, money-grubbing, indolence; of a stupid 
admiration of wealth, of rank, and of power;  a blind unsavory submissiveness; and an 
anxiety and fear which allows no zeal, and tends towards the most servile obedience” 
(Jacobi 1996, 200).  Drawing on Adam Ferguson’s Essay on the History of Civil Society,  
Jacobi argued that present governments were in fact despotic forms of rule that corrupted 
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civic virtue and individual morality by eradicating the freedom necessary if either is to 
flourish.24   
Mendelssohn criticized Jacobi’s argument in his contribution to a multi-authored 
critical essay that was published anonymously in the Deutsches Museum  of January 
1783. The essay had been assembled, at Jacobi’s request, from a number of critical letters 
Jacobi had received. His purpose in having these criticisms printed was to give him the 
pretext for writing a response that would amplify and clarify his original argument (see 
Altmann 1973, 599-600).  Against Jacobi, Mendelssohn maintained that “perfectly 
virtuous characters can be more easily formed under a despot” than in a republic and 
argued that the real questions, unanswered by Jacobi, were how one might go about 
transforming monarchies into popular regimes and whether such a step would be 
advisable.  Urging restraint in criticizing the political establishment, Mendelssohn asked, 
What is the point of all declamations which can lead to nothing, 
which should lead to nothing.  We tell a sick person, with all the 
embellishments of rhetoric, that he is dangerously ill;  but we do 
not tell him what he has to do to make himself healthy, or at least 
to lessen his suffering.  It would be better for him to think he is 
healthy, than to hear a truth, which cannot be useful to him. (Jacobi 
1815, 399-400)25   
                                                
24 Long quotations from the “noble Ferguson” may be found in Jacobi 1996, 198-200. Jacobi also drew 
on two other defenders of republican virtue: Montesquieu (Jacobi 1996, 210 footnote 15) and 
Machiavelli (Jacobi 1996 204-6).  For a discussion of Jacobi’s use of Ferguson, see Oz-Salzberger 
1995, 257-279. 
25 As support for the argument that virtuous characters can be formed more easily under despotisms than 
republics, Mendelssohn appealed to Lessing’s decision to set his Nathan in Turkey, and to Socrates, 
who “was raised in Athens at a time when the form of government was inclined towards tyranny” 
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In his rejoinder, Jacobi (1815, 409) argued that such reticence could easily be overdone.  
“I fully agree with the view: that one must not extinguish candles until it is day,”  he 
wrote in his response,  “But it does no harm at least to undo the shutters”  and thus avoid 
the fate of those “who out of fear of awakening too early have slept until a second 
sunset.” 
Jacobi’s attack on the Berlin Enlightenment did not stop with the critique of its 
political views; he also questioned its understanding of the relationship between religion 
and reason. It was this issue that lay at the heart of the Pantheism Controversy.  Jacobi’s 
reading of David Hume and Thomas Reid had convinced him that reason cannot attain 
certainty about the existence of external objects, and that our experience of such objects 
takes the form of a revelation that is beyond argument and rests on “faith” alone.26  
Carrying this dichotomy between the spheres of faith and knowledge into theology, he 
argued that reason alone can never lead to certainty of God’s existence.  This, he claimed, 
was the lesson he took from Spinoza.27 
I love Spinoza because he, more than any other philosopher, has 
led me to the full realization that certain things cannot be 
                                                                                                                                            
(Jacobi 1815, 399). The latter example is hardly compelling; with the exception of an oligarchy 
imposed by Sparta briefly at the close of the Peloponnesian war, Socrates’ Athens was a democracy. 
26 For the importance of Hume and Reid, see Hammacher 1971, 120-121; Jacobi’s most extended 
discussion of Hume is found in his David Hume über die Glaube, oder Idealismus und Realismus in 
Jacobi 1815, 127-288, esp.  152-153 and 156-163. This rather strange reading of Hume is aided by 
Jacobi’s translation of Hume’s “belief” by the German “Glaube” (which carries religious 
connotations not found, for example, in “Meinung”); see Merlan 1967 483-4 and di Giovanni’s 
discussion in Jacobi 1994, 90. 
27 For a discussion of Jacobi’s use of Spinoza, see Beiser,  54-55, 79-91 and di Giovanni’s discussion in 
Jacobi 1994, 73-90. 
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unraveled:  one must not turn one’s eyes from them;  rather they 
must be taken as they are found.  … I must assume a principle of 
thought and action that remains totally inexplicable to me. (Jacobi 
1994, 193) 
For Jacobi, the goal of philosophy was not to explain the reasons for what existed.  Its 
aim was rather simply “to disclose,  to reveal existence.” 
Explanation is the means,  the path to a goal,  the next task — 
never the last task.  This last task is what can never be explained:  
the irresolvable, the immediate, the simple. (Jacobi 1994, 194). 
Spinoza’s importance for Jacobi lay in his relentless attempt to provide a complete 
explanation for the world. His failure, in Jacobi’s eyes, to account for human freedom 
demonstrated what resisted reason and had to be taken on faith alone. 
Jacobi had already provided a sketch of this discussion of the limits of reason in a 
passage near the beginning of Something Lessing Said in which he argued that apologists 
for enlightened absolutism had fundamentally misunderstood the relationship between 
reason and the passions: 
What distinguishes man from animals and shapes his particular 
species is the capacity to see a relationship among ends and to 
guide his conduct by this insight. 
  
Out of this source of humanity flows, in all its tributaries, the same 
reason [Vernunft], only overflowing beds and between banks of 
immense diversity and size and hiding its efflux from all eyes.  
These beds, these banks are the passions.  Many have wanted to 
see it differently, and — against all appearances and arguments — 
Liberalism and Enlightenment in Eighteenth -Century Germany  22 
 
have taken reason for the banks, and the passions for the stream. 
(Jacobi 1996, 193) 
Jacobi was not disparaging reason. Indeed, he argued that only when “man is determined 
in and by himself” can he be said to be “fully human.” “Where there is no freedom, no 
self-determination, there is no humanity” (Jacobi 1996, 193). He was, however, insisting 
(like Hume before him) on the relative weakness of reason in the face of the passions. 
Hence the difficulty facing political theory: civil society must be “an institution of reason 
and not of the passions, a means of freedom and not of slavery, constituted for beings 
who by nature stand in the middle between the two.”  Because reason can “never 
command a passion as such” civil society must find a way of turning the passions against 
each other, in order “to inhibit or stop one passion by means of another (Jacobi 1996, 
194). A creation of human reason, civil society was a mechanism for checking the 
passions by means of the passions.  Its ultimate concern was not with making men good, 
but rather with protecting them from the actions of their fellow citizens. 
That coercion without which the society cannot exist does not have 
as its object that which makes man good, but rather that which 
makes him evil;  it has a negative rather than a positive purpose.  
This purpose can be preserved and secured through external form;  
and everything positive, virtue and happiness, then arise of 
themselves from their own source. (Jacobi 1996, 204) 
If we were looking for a brief summary of what liberalism meant in the eighteenth 
century, it would be difficult to improve on this passage. 
 
Liberalism and the Limits of Reason 
This brief sketch of the political views of Mendelssohn and Jacobi has led us to what may 
strike some as an unexpected result: Jacobi, the relentless critic of the Enlightenment, 
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articulated a vision of civil society that was recognizably liberal, while Mendelssohn, the 
Enlightenment’s faithful defender, elaborated a political philosophy that, in many 
respects, is difficult to square with liberal principles. Jacobi saw the function of 
legislation as fundamentally negative; its purpose was not to make men good, but rather 
to protect individual rights. Mendelssohn, in contrast, saw politics as performing an 
important role in the process of achieving our destiny. When the destinies of man and 
citizen come into conflict, the public good trump individual rights. 
Perhaps this result should not be all that surprising. Blanket generalizations about 
“liberalism” and “the Enlightenment” rarely provide much insight into the messier 
relationships that make up the history of political thought. There are too many different 
tendencies within the various efforts at enlightenment in late eighteenth-century Europe 
to inspire much confidence in generalizations about them. Indeed, sometimes it appears 
that the only commentators confident in making generalizations about what “the 
Enlightenment” stood for are those who are in the process of dismissing it (see Schmidt 
1998). The same may well be true of liberalism.  Asking questions about the relationship 
between “the Enlightenment” and “liberalism” may be asking for trouble. 
Yet there may still be a utility in such an exercise insofar as it reminds us of how 
multifaceted the various intellectual currents that we call the Enlightenment were and of 
the role that a certain skepticism about reason played within both the Enlightenment and  
liberalism. The story that has been sketched here suggests that it may well have been 
Mendelssohn’s confidence in what reason could achieve that led him to adopt certain 
positions that prevent us from classifying him as a liberal. Likewise, Jacobi’s doubts 
about the power of reason fueled both his critique of the Berlin Enlightenment and his 
advocacy of political positions that were more recognizably liberal than those adopted by 
Mendelssohn.  Some support for the suspicion that liberalism may best be fostered by an 
awareness of the limits of reason may be found in the series of essays that Kant published 
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between 1784 and 1786 in the Berlinische Monatsschrift. Splitting the difference between 
Mendelssohn and Jacobi, they sketch a different way of thinking about the relationship 
between enlightenment and liberalism.  
In his famous 1784 response to Zöllner’s question, Kant articulated a conception 
of enlightenment that departed in significant ways from Mendelssohn’s formulation (see 
Schmidt 1992). Defining enlightenment not in terms of what it achieves, but rather by 
what it escapes, he famously characterized it as mankind’s departure from a state of “self-
incurred immaturity.” In doing so, he tied his definition of enlightenment to an 
uncompromising defense of the free public use of reason (see Laursen,  1996 and 
O’Neill, 1989, 28-50). Two years later, in “What is Orientation in Thinking?” — his 
contribution to the Pantheism Dispute — he insisted, against Jacobi, that in seeking 
“orientation” in speculative thinking, there is no need to appeal to “some alleged truth-
sense, nor a transcendent intuition dubbed faith”;  here, as elsewhere, “reason alone” 
suffices (Kant 1949, 134). At the same time he argued that Mendelssohn had greatly 
overestimated what reason could demonstrate and thus failed to see that his defense of 
traditional proofs the existence of God represented a “dogmatizing with pure reason” 
that, paradoxically, culminated in “philosophical fanaticism”(Kant 1949, 297). The essay 
closed with yet another emphatic defense of the freedom of the press. 
As Onora O’Neill has suggested in a number of important essays,28 Kant’s 
defense of free and open public discussion is central to his understanding of the nature of 
reason itself. In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant rejected the axiomatic procedures of 
the geometrician as a way of establishing the authority of reason and instead developed 
                                                
28    See, in particular, O’Neill 1989, 3-27, especially 14-15, 17-20 and O’Neill 1990, 184-199, especially 
190-4. 
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his argument through images drawn from law and politics.  Critical philosophy, in this 
presentation, serves as “the true tribunal for all disputes of pure reason.” 
In the absence of this critique reason is, as it were, in the state of 
nature, and can establish and secure its assertions and claims only 
through war. Critique, on the other hand, … secures us the peace 
of a legal order, in which our disputes have to be conducted solely 
by the recognized method of legal action. … The endless disputes 
of a merely dogmatic reason thus finally constrain us to seek relief 
in some critique of reason itself, and in a legislation based upon 
such criticism. (A751-2/B779-80) 
When imported into philosophy, geometrical methods can produce only the “so many 
houses of cards” resting on foundations that must simply be accepted dogmatically 
(A727/B755). Reason, Kant insists, cannot derive its authority from such presuppositions. 
It “depends on freedom for its very existence” and “its verdict is always simply the 
agreement of free citizens, each of whom must be permitted to express … his objections 
or even his veto” (A738-9/B766-7). 
In his 1785 essay in the Berlinische Monatsschrift  on the relationship between 
theory and practice, Kant sketched a conception of the nature of civil society that was as 
emphatic as Jacobi’s in rejecting paternalistic conceptions of political rule.  Kant insisted 
that a “paternal government,” established on the principle of “benevolence” towards its 
people, represented “the greatest conceivable despotism.”  He called instead for a 
“patriotic government” in which each citizen is pledged to defend the individual’s right 
to liberty (Kant 1991, 74). We would seem to have returned to familiar ground: a defense 
of enlightenment and goes hand in hand with support for liberal principles of political 
rule. Kant limited what enlightened reason could promise while at the same time setting 
restrictions on what the state could attempt to achieve. In working out the historical 
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relationship between liberalism and the Enlightenment, Kant lends support to what the 
example of Mendelssohn and Jacobi has suggested: only an enlightenment that has 
learned to criticize itself can provide a secure foundation for liberal politics. 
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